Abstract: The surge in Pauline exegesis in the Latin world during the late fourth / early fifth century has been referred to as a "Pauline Renaissance". It produced numerous Pauline commentaries and led to a presence of Pauline motifs in many areas of late Roman cultural and intellectual life. This article is an attempt to show how it influenced not only
Introduction

Gennadius refers to Julian of Aeclanum as a Biblical scholar (in divinis scripturis doctus)
1 with a sharp mind (vir acer ingenio). Julian's intellectual encounter with Augustine in the aftermath of the condemnation of Pelagius and Caelestius in May 418 ignited this explosive concoction. Over large parts the debate between the two bishops was about the exegesis of certain passages of the Pauline corpus. 2 As in divinis scripturis doctus Julian would have taken his exegesis of the Apostle very seriously. 3 In particular, he would have thought of it not so much as his exegesis trait in the polemical works, where it is easily dismissed as a polemical technique. A comparison of Julian's Pauline exegesis in fragments of his polemical works with that in his non-polemical, exegetical, works, if this is at all possible, may show that this is not so, but that Julian really and rightly does see himself in a wider tradition of Patristic exegesis, a tradition which Augustine seems not to have known (or not to have cared for) to the same extent as Julian. Among the extant fragments from Julian's polemical writings those from Ad Turbantium (Turb.) offer themselves especially for such an investigation. They are not yet as singlemindedly polemical as those from Ad Florum (Flor.) and they may therefore be assumed to contain a wider variety of exegetical techniques, some of which are not exclusively polemical but can also be seen in non-polemical exegetical works. Among the exegetical works the Commentaries on Hosea, Joel and Amos (tr.
proph. or Tractatus) stand out, and among them especially the Commentary on Amos (tr. Amos). 10 We assume that Julian is indeed the author of the Tractatus.
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But even if this should one day be convincingly disproved, one can still argue that a comparison like the one proposed here may demonstrate that Julian's exegetical technique even and especially in his polemical works fitted well in the context of fourth and fifth century Pauline exegesis. Vice versa, on the assumption that the Tractatus really is Julian's work, the similarity between the exegetical techniques applied in it with those on display in the polemical works, especially Turb., can be regarded as further evidence for Julian's authorship of the Tractatus.
Paul in tr. Amos and in other Patristic Commentaries of Amos
The strong presence of Paul in Julian's tr. Amos is striking. It is not so much the quantity of Pauline references as their exegetical treatment which dominates the commentary. In mere quantitative terms it does not even amount to all that much: sixteen citations, paraphrases and "strong" allusions 12 in total, four from Romans, six from 1 Corinthians, and one each from 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, Galatians, Philippians and 2 Timothy. 13 Only Theodore of Mopsuestia has fewer Pauline references. Only once in his commentary, in the preface, he explicitely refers to Romans 4.
14 Otherwise Paul plays no role in his commentary, though it may be 10 For both texts I use the critical edition by L. De Coninck & E. M. D'Hont (CCL 88, . 11 For a Resumée listing and discussing the arguments in favour of this opinion see J. Lössl, "Julian of Aeclanum's Tractatus in Osee, Ioel et Amos," Augustiniana 51 (2001), pp. 11-37.
12 By "strong" I mean allusions which carry meaning for the exegesis of the passage concerned. 13 For a detailed breakdown of the passages and their locations see the 16 Cyril of Alexandria's commentary contains roughly the same number as Jerome's. 17 But both these commentaries are much longer than tr. Amos (ca. two times and two and a half times as long as tr. Amos) 18 and both contain far more references than tr. Amos to biblical and non-biblical sources other than the Pauline epistles. 19 (Wiesbaden, 1977) , pp. 112-13, points out, far less can be said about Theodore's theology on the basis of his commentary on the Twelve Prophets than of his Pauline work (the commentary edited by Swete and the fragments collected by Staab; see above note 5). For Julian of Aeclanum things are slightly different, not least because of the presence of Paul in tr. Amos. 16 For an overview of Jerome's use of Paul in his comm. in Amos see Appendix III and below n. 21. 17 Generally, Pauline references are quite frequent in Cyril's commentary. Yet there are big and significant gaps. The whole first book has only one Pauline reference at the end, and the elaborate exegesis of Am 6:1 has none at all. This is significant if compared with tr. Amos, where the whole exegesis is developed against the background of Rom 1:18-32. Pauline references in Cyril are also outweighed by other NT references, from James, 1 John, Acts and Gospels, but especially by OT references, especially Isaiah, Jeremiah and Hezekiel, 1 and 2 Kings, Psalms, Proverbs and Job. Paul is rarely cited in his own right but often integrated into clusters. Noteworthy among the frequent "Pauline" references in Cyril's commentary are those to Eph. Eph 2:6, 4:7, 4:14, 5:5, 5:9 and 6:12 are repeatedly cited. Perhaps this reflects the role of the epistle in fourth and fifth century theology, especially in Alexandria (see Heine, Commentaries, 19 A rough estimate suggests that Jerome's commentary contains ca. 350 OT references and ca. 100 NT references from parts of the NT that are not Pauline. Cyril's has a similar proportion of OT and NT references. Classical and Patristic references (or sources) have not been counted in this survey, as they do not fulfil the same function as biblical references in the attempt to establish an authoritative reading of a text. Thus for every Pauline reference in Cyril and Jerome there are more than ten others and often the Pauline references are closely embedded in groups or clusters of them with the result that a specific Pauline interpretation of a passage is often lost, even when Pauline texts are cited in connection with it. Tr. Amos in contrast has ca. 50 OT references and 15 NT references other than Pauline. Especially the NT proportion is striking. Already in quantitative terms alone, therefore, Pauline material dominates tr. Amos, and when it occurs within a cluster it often tends to dominate it too. 20 The following examples from Jerome's commentary might give an impression: Hier. comm. in Amos What is most striking is that there are hardly any overlaps between Julian's and Jerome's citations. 21 It is well known that tr. Amos depends heavily on Jerome's comm. in Amos. Some have even suggested that Julian simply copied Jerome.
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The evidence gathered in this paper should drive another nail into the coffin of this theory. In fact Julian's emphasis is quite different from Jerome's, on whose text tr. Amos none the less depends in many ways, but not in this. To introduce Paul as a prophet and to treat the prophet like an apostle by putting key Pauline passages alongside passages from Amos and comparing them by giving them an elaborate exegetical treatment is a technique which Julian has not from Jerome or of the Gospel passage the Pauline character of the exegesis is relativised. 1.3.8 (246.91-94; 247.127) groups Rom 10:20 and 1 Cor 6:17 with Is 65:1 and Rom 16:20 with Ps 139:6. Especially revealing here is first the phrase: Paulus loquitur, and immediately following: et rursum in Dauid legimus. Similarly in 2.4.9 (265.319) 1 Cor 7:9 is combined with 1 Peter 4:12 and Jerome makes a point of letting apostolus be joined, and dominated, by princeps apostolorum. In 2.4.10 (267.369-372) we have first an allusion to Gal 2:19-21 and then in rapid succession citations of Rom 6:8, 2 Cor 4:10, Gal 2:20 and Rom 13:12. But this ostensibly Pauline cluster is interwoven with Is 9:8, Gen 32:24-25 and Ps 37:6. Whenever a Pauline citation is introduced, it is immediately connected with an OT reference, which then has the last word. But even when the Pauline material is overwhelming, this impression is never completely overcome. Ironically, it is precisely the sheer number of references without any further exegetical development that frustrates the creation of a Pauline focus. This is most obvious in 1.2. 13-16 (242.434-461) where in rapid succession the following verses are cited: 1 Cor 9:24, Gal 5:7, Phil 3:12, 2 Tim 4:7-8, Rom 9:16, and 1 Cor 1:19. The list ends with an allusion to Eph 6:11.13.17 and it is interspersed with Ps 138:7, Is 29:14 and Ps 143:1-2. Enough Pauline material to create a Pauline focus one should think. But it does not happen. The citations remain citations. There is no exegetical development that would breath some life into them. A similar case in Cyril's commentary is the explanation of Amos 8:10 (PG 71, 556), where in rapid succession Lk 16:14, Mt 27:45, Rom 11:25, 2 Cor 3:15, Ps 78:24, Lk 13:27-28, Mt 27:51 and Is 50:3 are cited. Here, too, as in Jerome, the exegete's interest is far wider than to develop a Pauline interpretation of Amos. This also squares with M. Simonetti's observation that in general Cyril prefers literal interpretation and keeping the OT to itself: "Note sul commento di Cirillo d'Alessandria ai Profeti minori," Vetera Christianorum 14 (1977), pp. 301-30 at 328-29. 21 There may be dependencies. For instance in the preface to Book 2 of his commentary (255.3-4) Jerome cites 2 Cor 12:9-10 (...uirtus in infirmitate perficitur...) and further on (255.4-5, 30-31) Gal 5:17 (caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum...) and Rom 7:15.24 (non quod uolo...). Jerome's exegesis of the second cluster squares with the findings discussed under note 5. Gal 5:17 is read together with Mt 26:41 and interpreted from an ascetic point of view. Rom 7:15.24 is accompanied by a comment stating that the flesh is weak. The concern here is not to express a genuine Pauline anthropology, but to make use of Paul for a commentary of Amos. 2 Cor 12:9-10, however, is different. Here the similarities of Amos and Paul must come to mind (especially the aspect of the prophet's and the apostle's 'weakness' and vulnerability); and although (yet again) Jerome does not develop the motif, it is developed in tr. Amos 1.1.1 (CCL 88, 261 The prophets, Julian sets out in the preface to his commentary, safeguard not only the magisterium of the Synagogue, but also the foundation of the church. To this the teacher of the gentiles, Paul, bears witness. For he commends the building of the Church upon the teaching of the apostles and the prophets. 24 Julian alludes here to Eph 2:20a: The church is built on the teachings of the apostles and prophets. Both strands of teaching taken together make up its foundations. But the wording of the passage (aedificari ecclesiam) also evokes 1 Cor 14:4, where "building up the church" is identified with "prophesying". Now the concept of prophecy in the Early Church generally was a complex and problematic one. 25 Early Christian writers sought to define it against Old Testament concepts as well as against pagan and gnostic concepts. At the heart of the problem lay the tension between chaos and order, irrationalism and rationalism, enthusiasm ("ecstasy") and reason, authority and criticism, poetry and poetics ("exegesis"). In Julian's time many issues which had been controversial in earlier centuries had been settled and become integrated in the vocabulary and rhetoric of theological discourse. Thus right at the beginning of the preface to the Tractatus, Julian calls David, whom he assumes to be the poet-composer of the Psalms, a divinely inspired poet and bard, fidicen, a word very similar to uates, which had been used in pagan Roman religion for poets like Virgil and Horace. In the same breath Julian equates David to the prophets whom he is about to comment upon. 27 Now, in the preface to tr. Amos, he more or less equates Paul to Amos and thus blurs the boundaries between Old and New Testament concepts of prophecy.
This kind of exegesis of an Old Testament prophet book had only become possible after a long development, though in some sense this development, which had begun with Philo and Paul, was now also coming full circle. In earlier generations the discourse had been dominated by the exclusivist heresiological and polemical rhetoric of the Montanist controversy. It is significant that in this controversy both sides could, and did, credibly appeal to Paul. 28 This was possible because there are tensions already in Paul between ecstatic and non-ecstatic ("rational") prophecy, and between prophecy and exegesis. These tensions did not originate with Paul. They can also be traced in other writers, for example in Philo, 29 who may have influenced Paul, at least indirectly in the sense that both men shared a common intellectual background. 30 And there is a yet deeper dimension to this. Ecstasy, whether as trance or as heightened intellectual awareness, is a state of mind not limited to any particular religious or cultural tradition, or to any particular method of acquisition. It can occur spontaneously, or it can be generated with the help of psychological techniques. 31 Most notably however it can also be learned in a more enlightened educational context through the acquisition of certain poetic, rhetorical (exegetical) and intellectual skills including the ability to learn by heart, recite and explain poems, epics, hymns, psalms and other literary forms. Early Greek epic and its exegesis are thought to have developed in this way. 32 During that period one way of tackling the tension between ecstasy and reason was to synthesise and define one as the other. The tendency to do this has, as we saw, been observed in Philo and Paul. Sometimes controversies broke out. Some Early Christian authors in their quest to define their identity sought to draw a clear line between their own different concepts of prophecy (Old and New Testament, ecstatic and non-ecstatic) on the one hand, and non-Christian, pagan, concepts on the other. These distinctions could sometimes be arbitrary and inconsistent. John Chrysostom distinguished between προφήτης and μάντις ("seer"), the first being conscious of what he is saying, and capable of judging it, the second being ecstatic and therefore not in control. 33 But the classical use does not warrant such a clear distinction between the two expressions, and Paul himself, or so it seems, did not suppress ecstatic prophecy, nor did early, pre-Montanist, Christian writers. The "Montanists" for their part had a strong case when they justified their practices against their opponents, and they did so on rational grounds, foremost among them Tertullian. 34 Authors writing in the post-Montanist period were aware of that. Origen did not so much simply refute ecstatic prophecy 35 as to try and redefine it within a rational framework:
36 A man, he writes, who has the spirit of prophecy, cannot be forced against his will to speak (non inuitus loqui cogitur), as men who are possessed by unclean spirits. Rather, he speaks whenever he wants and when reason requires it: cum uult et ratio postulat.
Jerome, under Origen's influence, if not outright dependence, 37 writes similarly in his commentary on Ephesians:
38 "It must then either be accepted along with 33 Ioh. Chrys. hom. in I Cor 14.3 (PG 61:241.311); for προφήτης compare also F. Prostmeier, Der Barnabasbrief (Göttingen 1999), pp. 255-83, who writes that although it was clear that the ministry of the προφήτης within a Christian congregation was not that of a μάντις, the meaning of the word in ordinary language was open to such an interpretation. This seems also to be suggested by Ammianus Marcellinus 15.7, who reports that Athanasius had the reputation of being gifted as a prophet (in the mantic sense). Vice versa, a μάντις in ancient Greek society may have had a similar role as a προφήτης in an early Christian community; cf. R. C. T. Parker, 'Prophētēs, ' The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3 rd ed. 1996 , p. 1259 See for this famously Tert. anim. 9.4 (Waszink), where Tertullian relates ecstatic prophecy and its subsequent explanation as a rational process; discussed in J. Lössl, "Prophetie und Homilie," in F. Prostmeier, K. Wenzel, eds., Zukunft der Kirche -Kirche der Zukunft (Regensburg 2003), pp. 61-74, 68.
35 Against C. P. Bammel, "Die Prophetie in der patristischen Exegese zum ersten Korintherbrief," in Id., Tradition and Exegesis in Early Christian Writers (Aldershot, 1995) , XIV, p. 160. Though Bammel is clear and straightforward in her account and her argument is based on textual evidence, she does not ask how Origen could have sustained it in the wider context of his work. A passage that may appear to be clear and straightforward while taken on its own might appear less so when put in a wider context. Montanus that the patriarchs and prophets spoke in ecstasy and did not know what they said, or, if this is blasphemous inasmuch as the spirit of prophets is subject to prophets (1 Cor 14:32), they understood very well what they spoke." 39 Montanus and Montanism were no longer live issues in Jerome's time. The question how to relate prophecy and ecstasy however was. And where Jerome does not provide an answer, Julian does, as did Diodore of Tarsus before him, who, similar to Origen, compared the raptus of the prophet with the ratio of the exegete and saw both united in one person.
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The quest for a rational concept of prophecy must not be mistaken for a quest to abolish prophecy. The point was precisely not to abolish the original tension between prophecy and reason, but to define the conditions under which it was to be maintained. One further aspect here is the relationship between the spoken and the written word and between canonical and non-canonical scripture. As the canon was formed and interpreted in an increasingly literary and eclesiastically regulated context, the tension became ever more subtle. On the one hand, prophecy could now be called doctrine and the prophet a teacher, as in the Budapest Anonymus, who comments upon 1 Cor 14:3:
41 "Note, 'prophecy' here means doctrine." On the other hand, doctrine still had to be interpreted, i. e. "prophecy" was still required. Thus a generation before Julian Ambrosiaster wrote about prophecy that it was either prediction of future events, in particular the coming of Christ, or it was interpretation, exegesis, of biblical texts relating to these events. There is no fundamental distinction here between Old Testament prophecy and later forms of prophecy. Both aspects are included in 1 Cor 14:3-4. 42 If Julian is expressing a similar view by relating, or even equating, Paul and Amos in the preface to tr. Amos, he does in some sense link up with Philo and Paul. 43 And as the example of Ambrosiaster indicates, he does so inspired by the study of Paul. what will be borne out in other parts of the commentary, namely that its author is a "Paulinist", of a similar kind as Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, or the early Augustine.
A Prophetic Exegesis of Paul and a Pauline Exegesis of the Prophet
The preface of tr. Amos, as it relates Amos' prophecy to an early fifth century take on Paul's understanding of prophecy as prophecy and its interpretation (influenced by Philo or more generally Hellenistic Jewish concepts), without distinguishing Old and New Testament understandings of prophecy, bears witness to early fifth century Paulinism. This is consistent with Antiochene influences spotted elsewhere in the Tractatus, Diodore's explanation of the raptus of the prophet and exegete mentioned earlier, the concept of theoria, 44 i. e. the historical understanding of a deeper scriptural sense as opposed to the meta-historical understanding of allegory, or the idea that the ecstasy of the Old Testament prophets was historically limited, in the sense that they had only a limited sense of the coming of Christ (or none at all) and that later interpretation may well add something to the meaning which they originally intended in their proclamations. 45 Thus a post-New Testament exegete may ascribe to Amos's prophecies a larger, though by no means necessarily less appropriate, meaning than that which the prophet may have had in mind when he expressed them. In other words, the prophetic and apostolic message was able to develop. Exegesis could be creative, synthetic, not just analytical. In this sense, interestingly, the Old Testament prophet, whether he was in ecstasy or not, was definitely not in control of his message. His view of the future was limited to the historical context in which and for which he prophesied. The wider context, and this includes the New Testament context, has been attributed to the prophecy by way of what we might today call reception, but reception as a highly active and creative process. This would mean that only in conjunction with its interpretation in the light of its fulfilment could prophecy be called "complete" and fully "true". What matters from this point of view is not whether or not prophecy was ecstatic when it was first proclaimed, but rather, whether it makes sense in the context of the whole of salvation history. This seems to have been the Antiochene view and also the view held by the author of the Tractatus.
A good example for the latter may be Julian's understanding of hyperbole and what he sometimes calls, in an unusual understanding of the word, excessus. 46 If, for example, according to Julian, the prophet speaks of a realistic historical event, e. g. the destruction of Jerusalem, in apocalyptic terms, he is exaggerating, i. Christ's second coming, then that which was hyperbole in regard to the original historical context, will turn out to be an understatement in regard to the anticipated eschatological event. When Christ comes, his coming will be an infinitely more momentous event than the sack of Jerusalem was either in the prophet's vision prior to 587BC or in Israel's memory afterwards.
If we take Julian's authorship of the Tractatus seriously, it is this kind of aspect which we must consider. For example, when Augustine -in the context of the Pelagian Controversy -criticises Julian's use of the adverb "hyperbolicos" 47 with reference to Rom 1:28 (tradidit illos deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quae non conueniunt), 48 Julian's use of hyperbole in his exegesis as a whole must be held against it. This particular verse, Rom 1:28, Julian interprets as follows, and here Augustine provides a rare literal quotation from Julian's Ad Turbantium:
"When Paul denounces the crimes of the wicked, he amplifies (aggrauauit) them by using for them names of punishments which they incur, and in so far as his heart, the seat of all virtues, is horrified by their blatant shame, he is saying that such people appear to him not so much as perpetrators than as damned."
The significant expression here is aggrauauit. Speech-acting almost like an Old Testament prophet Paul, according to Julian, uses exaggerating language in order to highlight the real, ultimate, not immediately obvious, meaning of the crimes which he denounces, to get the purpose of his message across; i. e. for rhetorical reasons, and not to indicate that there exists a causal link between the damnation of the damned (e. g. in the sense that they are not elected) and their evil-doing, as Augustine suggested. But which verses is Julian here referring to? Augustine cites Rom 1:28 and, a little further down in the same passage from c. Iul. 5.10-11, Rom 1:23-24. 49 If Julian says that Paul is here speaking of vices in terms of the punishments which they incur, he may have been thinking along the lines of Stoic apatheia, i. e. that being prone to desideria is equivalent to being punished. The responsible, free, act which justifies the punishment would at this stage already have been committed. This would have been the decision to be overcome by these desires; though the question arises, whether there ever was a point in time when that decision could have been taken, as bad habit (mala consuetudo) was developing from the time when the wicked person was not yet mature. Julian on the other hand would argue that a free decision for the better could be taken at any time.
50 This is how Julian thinks, as is obvious from the following fragments, Turb. frg. 166 and 167, where he adds, again literally: "For they were already inflamed with desire for shameful acts. In what way therefore are they to be believed to have fallen (cecidisse) into doing such things by the power of a God who makes them do such things (per potentiam tradentis dei)? [Rather,] when they are spoken of (dicuntur) as having been handed over or delivered up (traditi) to their desires, they should be understood (intellegendi sunt) as having been left (relicti) by divine patience, not compelled (compulsi) to commit sins through God's power. For,"
Julian adds in fragment 168, "as the Apostle says (Rom 2:4): ʻGod's goodness leads you to repent'", not, is the implication, to develop desires for evil deeds.
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When Julian makes these comments, he clearly thinks not only of the few verses cited by Augustine (on idol worship), which express the basic principle of idolatry, Rom 1:23-24 and 1:28, but he also has in mind those that develop the catalogue of sins in detail and deal more with the consequences of the primeval sin and with its punishment. Rom 1:26 calls these concrete sins passiones ignominiae. Rom 1:27 speaks of people who in desideriis aestuabant or exarserunt, a phrase to which Julian alludes in frg. 166, but refers specifically to sodomy and homosexuality. Now in the light of this let us return once more to tr. Amos. Amos 2:4 and 6 announce God's punishment of Judah and Israel for the three, four crimes which they committed and which are so grave that God will not pardon (conuertere) 53 either of the two: Super tribus sceleribus Iuda (2:6 Israhel) et super quattuor non conuertam eum. The crimes are, in detail, 1) disregarding God's Law and commandments, 2) engaging in idolatry, 3) committing social injustice, 4) committing sexual perversion (in this case father and son visiting the same prostitute). Judah is blamed with 1), Israel with 2) to 4). Julian interprets the four verses (4-5 and 6-7) as follows. He first draws attention to the religious aspect focusing on Judah: After accusing all the other nations of their evildoings, he argues, the prophet turns to the religious crime (religionis facinus) of Judah, their abandoning of God's Law, by which they had been singled out and privileged as a nation among all others, in toto orbe. Instead of living up to that status they are now subjecting themselves to idol cults. Consequently, they received the reward they deserved. Judah and Jerusalem were consumed by fire. It was the Babylonians through whom the prophecy was fulfilled (Amos 2:5: et mittam ignem et Iudam, et deuorabit aedes Hierusalem) .
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Israel in contrast is not accused of idol worship, but of crimes violating mores. Not that these were worse than crimes violating ritual laws, they were however the fruit of religious corruption (fructus foedae religionis), and, Julian adds, Israel behaved worse in committing them than all the other nations (ceteris gentibus nequiores). One led to the other, the denial of God on the ground of superbia led to disregard for neighbour and brother, i. e. to social injustice and oppression of the poor, and then to disregard for the sisters and the brother's daughters, i. e. to sexual exploitation. At this point in the commentary Julian cites Amos 2:7b, which is missing from the lemma. It reads: Viam humilium declinant. This, Julian says, can be understood in two ways: 1) They leave the way of the humble and follow a different path in life; 2) In the courts they ruin the just cause of the poor through fraud (in iudiciis iustam inopum causam fraude commaculant). To this Julian cites Ps 49[Hebr. 50]:18.20: "When you see a thief, you go with him, and you have also common cause with adulterers ... You defame your brother, you callously offend the son of your mother." And it is at this point that Julian adds: "But that kind of understanding ʻexaggerates' the guilt of the delinquents, because, pursuing as they were activities dedicated to that which is outright nasty, they were exposed as not merely neglecting, but as actively hating justice." 55 Julian also detects here an "order" or a logic of sin and evil:
"The prophet," he writes, "continues with a detailed listing of the various crimes. After injustice and presumption he touches upon sins of pleasure: 'Son and father,' he says, 'join the same girl, and thus violate my sacred name.' He demonstrates in what large numbers of delinquents bad habit (consuetudo) enters. 'First,' he says, 'you deny citizens justice in court and compassion in adversity; then follows, in a continuous development, that not even the laws of nature itself are kept any more in your society. But moving on from shameful conduct generally to incest in particular fathers together with their sons visit the same prostitutes. So people show no more respect, first to other citizens, and eventually not even to their own parents. Surely, through this crime of yours my holy name has been violated as well, and the nations are talking among each other like this: ʻWhat kind of God is that, whose people, said to be his very own, appears to be so horrible? '" 57 After looking at this passage the references to hyperbole and exaggeration in Turb. may read slightly different from the way Augustine would have liked them to be read. In Julian's view Paul described the way of the Gentiles into sin by way of bad habit in exactly the same "exaggerated" manner as Amos described the way of his people into sin. He applied the prophetic order (ordo propheticus):
58 This is what will happen, if this kind of behaviour is drawn to its bitter end. And this may also be how a passage such as Turb. frg. 321 has to be understood: "The Apostle amplifies the force of habit;" 59 meaning, he demonstrates in a drastic manner where it can lead, not in order to use it as an excuse to continue with the bad behaviour, but to encourage the audience or the readership to abandon it, and to remind them of their responsibility and their ability to do so.
Julian does not explicitely draw a parallel between Rom 1:18-32 and Amos 2:2-7. What has so far been presented therefore lacks sufficient hard evidence to state with any certainty Pauline influence upon the passage. But Julian does explicitely refer to the pericope when he discusses Amos 6:1. In this section of his commentary several of the strands already touched upon are converging again. The lemma is well known: "Woe to you who dwell rich and powerful upon Zion, and to you, so self-assured on Mount Samaria etc." 60 In his exegesis Julian writes:
"God has always had a particular dislike for presumption. So Scripture frequently tells us. It, presumption, is of course the entry point of sin, initium peccati, and it is of such kind that it turns angels into demons. This is also why Saint David expresses his worry that one should fall under the foot of the presumptuous (Ps 35:12). 'For that,' he says, 'is where all those fall who do evil (Ps 35:13).' In making this accusation (increpatio) David keeps to the prophetic order (propheticus ordo). He demonstrates that presumption is more or less the fruit of godlessness. Paul (apostolus) sets out in his sermo (Rom 1:18-32) in the same vein. Those who turn away from God begin to serve creatures, and Paul then lists a series of crimes and misdemeanours and pronounces in addition that those to whom this applies sin excessively (nefandis actibus scatere) on the ground that they violate before God the laws of piety."
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This passage unites several aspects that were already discussed separately, spread out over a number of passages: 1) Presumption (superbia) is the starting point of sin (initium peccati). Although in itself an allusion to Eccl 10:14, this is early Augustine down to the very terminology, including the fall of the angels. 62 Augustine cites the verse more than 150 times in his work, but the emphasis on free will and the fall of the angels in context with it is much stronger in the earlier period, see e. g. Aug. uera 2) Saint David, the poet, composer and performer of the Psalms and a prophet in his own right acts here as the prophet as which he was introduced in the overall preface of the Tractatus. He keeps his proclamation to the prophetic order. This is a motif from the preface of the Tractatus. 3) Julian sees the same order also at work in Paul. Rom 1:18-32 sets out the ordo propheticus in the same way as Amos does, or David in Psalms. According to this order the sinner progresses from the basic sin, presumption (superbia), which is ultimately directed against God, to idolatry (worship of creatures), and from there to committing all kinds of other crimes and misdemeanours, in society (injustice), in the family, and even against the elders, as described in the exegesis of Amos 2:4-7.
Paul as Prophet and the Prophet as Evangelist
Thus, as already indicated, Julian's unusually intensive use of Paul in tr. Amos seems motivated by some theological principle or idea, at the core of which might lie Paul's very person. Julian seems to understand Paul as a prophet. This is the topic of the last passage to be discussed in this paper, which is once more to be found at the beginning of the commentary. In his discussion of Amos 1:1 Julian addresses, among others, the question of the prophet's identity and humble background. 63 He refers to Amos 7:14-15, where Amos is pointing out the contrast between his origin and his being called to prophecy: "I was neither a prophet nor a prophet's son, but a shepherd and a tender of sycamores, and yet the Lord took hold of me and commissioned me to be a prophet." "Now this," Julian comments, "is the kind of modest attitude (modestiae uirtus) which Paul, the doctor of nations (doctor gentium), too, displays, when he says, 'To prevent me from becoming presumptuous on the ground of the magnitude of the revelations [that are granted to me] a sting for the flesh was given to me, an angel of Satan who strikes me. Therefore I asked the Lord three times that he leave me. This comparison of an Old Testament prophet with Paul is unusual. It cannot be found in other commentaries. Jerome's, on which tr. Amos generally depends, and which in turn shows dependencies on Origen's, Eusebius' and Apollinaris', does not go as far as that. In connection with Amos 1:1 it merely cites Amos 7:14-15, without any further explanation, and where Jerome comments on the lemma of Amos 7:14-15 he compares it with the situation of Peter and the other Apostles before the high priest in Jerusalem, where they justify their "prophetic activity" with the words in Acts 5:29: "One must obey God more than men." Jerome thus focuses on the external similarities between the prophet and the Apostles, their being dragged before a religious court and threatened with expulsion, and their standing up against religious authority, similar to Amos. Julian in contrast highlights the prophet's "inner calling" and the paradox it represents, the puzzlement to Amos himself (his humble origin vs. his lofty mission), and he compares this with Paul's call, and its inherent paradox (being a sinner, but at the same time being made perfect by God's grace precisely in his weakness).
What is also interesting in this last passage is the way it picks up phrases first used in the preface of tr. Amos:
"Having finished with the explanation of [the book of] saint Joel," the preface begins, "we are now, as far as our ability, with God's help, permits, by the very order of the task before us summonsed to the third prophet, who is called Amos, a man glorified no less by the humility of his kind than by the eminence of his virtue. Lacking entirely the backing of parental privileges, he achieved solely by his own merits (solis meritis) to be numbered among the prophets, who, as I say, are not only guarantors for the magisterium of the Synagogue, but also for the foundation of the church, as the teacher of the nations (magister gentium) testifies, who commends the church to be built on the teaching of the apostles and the prophets."
64
Thus for Julian the message of Amos and Paul is essentially the same. Prophetia is doctrina. 65 Paul is doctor and magister gentium in the same way as Amos is prophet. God's gratia is man's uirtus, humilitas is modestia, low birth is spiritual aristocracy, achieved by merit alone, solis meritis. This is not mere moralism, as can be found in Jerome, this is some kind of synergism, similar perhaps to that of John Chrysostom. Its purpose within the commentary becomes clear, when we turn to verse 1:2, where the prophet interprets the earthquake, reported in verse 1, as the voice of God. God's commission has put the prophet into a state of grace in which he sees the world with "prophetic eyes" (prophetalibus oculis). 66 For him the quake is no longer a "natural" (naturae) event, but an expression of God's anger. 67 Julian contrasts this perspective with ancient scientific theories about the natural causes of earthquakes. Yet it is not these theories in which he is interested, at least not here, 68 but their relative validity within the framework of a theology which balances nature and grace on the basis of a strong concept of creation, as is also typical for the Julian of the second Pelagian controversy:
"A great many of those who stand out as curious in negotiations of this kind opine that dryness provides the causes of earthquakes, and they try to prove this with examples and to argue for it in disputations. Nevertheless, we need not replicate these [theories] now. I merely mentioned that in passing." 69 For Julian the reason why he should not indulge in a natural explanation of the earthquake here lies in the text: "It will have inflicted a twin calamity, when the commotion has hardly started yet."
70
Whatever the natural processes at work, Julian argues, whether a quake caused the drought by upsetting the wells or whether a drought caused the quake by contracting the earth, both remind us of the power of the creator (potentia conditoris), which is also the power of the judge (potentia iudicantis), who in the same way as 71 However, it is the natural processes through which God works here and as in the polemical works Julian knows no other form of grace than that which has been laid down in and through nature in creation.
Summary and Conclusion
Julian's use of Paul in tr. Amos is striking. It has implications for the understanding of his use of Paul in his polemical works, particularly Turb. He treats Paul as a prophet, which in the light of early Christian problems with the Pauline concept of prophecy (Montanism!) cannot have been unproblematic in the eyes of his contemporaries. It certainly distinguishes him from Jerome, whose commentary of Amos is otherwise the single most important source for tr. Amos. Not that Julian held an "enthusiastic" concept of prophecy. Yet he does not reject the notion of "ecstasis" either, rather he uses a redefined concept similar to that used by other Pauline commentators at the time. ) it is as part of the Epistula ad Menoch, a document which Julian introduces as a Manichaean document to demonstrate that Augustine's interpretation of the verse is Manichaean, i. e. dualistic and denying free will. In ep. Men. the verse is cited to support the concept of two realities (two souls, duae animae) fighting each other like two persons, one, flesh (caro), "daughter of desire" (filia concupiscentiae), the other, spirit (spiritus), "son of the mind-soul" (filius animae). This duality is suppressing individual free will. The human being is stuck with these two forces and cannot overcome its anti-spiritual desire by its own power. Augustine's discussion of Gal 5.17 in his early, anti- Manichaean, exp. ep. Gal 46 (CSEL 84, 122) , too, underlines the importance of the verse in Manichaean exegesis: "ʻPeople'", Augustine writes there, "think that the Apostle is here denying that we have free choice of the will" (putant hic homines liberum uoluntatis arbitrium negare apostolum). There is no evidence that Augustine wrote this specifically with ep. Men. in mind. But that he thought of a current Manichaean exegesis is undeniable. And it was the very first thought that seems to have come to his mind, when he read Gal 5.17.
It 
